Demonetisation, ten years on: a costly economic experiment

The note ban was announced in 2016, just two years after Narendra Modi came to power. It promised a lot for the Indian economy, but its most ambitious promises remain on paper
A close-up of Mahatma Gandhi's picture on a currency note
Raghavendra V Konkathi/Unsplash
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On November 8, 2016, I was aboard a VT-Panvel local train in Mumbai, returning home after a day's work in the newsroom. My phone rang around 8.20 pm. It was from one of the senior editors at my office.

He sounded like he was in a battle zone, quite hassled: “Dinesh, could you do a quick copy on what this would mean?” I had no clue and asked, “About what?” Just then the call was disconnected as the network was lost. I checked my phone: a bunch of messages from office and home; all said one thing: Prime Minister Narendra Modi had just announced the ban on ₹500 and ₹1,000 currency notes from midnight.

The word spread quickly, and ‘demonetisation’ soon became the most talked-about word. I, along with hundreds of other journalists in the country, panicked and started filing stories on its goals, implications and developments on the ground.

The scale of what the PM called a ‘Mahayagna’ (a grand sacrifice) was huge. Nearly 86% of the currency in circulation was rendered illegal in one go. This meant a severe shortage of cash in the system--banks, ATMs, shops and even petrol pumps. By the time I got off the train, every ATM on the way had at least 10-20 people in queues, frantically discussing the implications of the move. Some praised the government's stated intent to curb black money and fake currency, and reduce the usage of cash in the financial system; some called it a big mistake.

What followed in the next few months was chaos. Long lines emerged outside every bank and ATM as people either exchanged old notes or withdrew new ones, including the new ₹2,000 notes launched two days later. The sudden withdrawal of 86% of the currency from the system wreaked havoc across industries, businesses and households. Supply chains came to a halt, and massive layoffs ensued. In his Rajya Sabha speech on November 24, former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh called the noteban “monumental mismanagement”, “organised loot” and “legalised plunder of the common people”. Opposition parties claimed hundreds of people reportedly lost their lives as a direct result of demonetisation, while the Centre said it did not have any official records of such deaths.

The economic disruption following demonetisation reflected in employment and business activity. The Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) estimated that around 1.5 million jobs were lost between January and April 2017, with the impact extending into the months that followed. However, the estimate does not isolate demonetisation as the sole cause of these job losses. Similarly, the Registrar of Companies struck off 2.26 lakh companies in 2017 for non-compliance and apparent inactivity. The government has not established how many of these closures were directly attributable to demonetisation.

So, did demonetisation achieve its stated goals? Ten years on, data shows that cash is still king, with currency held by the public having more than doubled after the exercise. Fake currency, too, continues to be a menace in India's economy.

A decade later, currency with the public has more than doubled, rising from ₹15.98 lakh crore in March 2016 to ₹40.65 lakh crore in March 2026, according to RBI data. The increase comes despite the government's objective of curbing the cash economy. Meanwhile, 99.3% of the ₹15.42 lakh crore worth of demonetised ₹500 and ₹1,000 notes returned to the banking system, leaving just ₹10,720 crore unreturned, according to the RBI's 2017-18 annual report. Till date, the government has not published a comprehensive estimate of black money eliminated through demonetisation. Banks detected around 2.30 lakh counterfeit notes in 2025-26, meaning the problem persists. These figures, however, reflect notes detected by the banking system and not the total stock of counterfeit currency in circulation.

That said, one area where demonetisation may have worked well is in accelerating the shift to digital payments, although the growth cannot be attributed to the currency ban alone. The Unified Payments Interface (UPI), launched in 2016, has grown from just 1.78 crore transactions worth ₹0.07 lakh crore in 2016-17 to 24,162 crore transactions worth nearly ₹314 lakh crore in 2025-26, according to government data. The UPI processed a record 2,546.67 crore transactions worth ₹31.53 lakh crore in October 2026, according to the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI). UPI accounted for nearly 86% of retail payment transactions in 2025-26, according to the RBI. Overall, digital payment transactions have expanded 38-fold in volume over the decade ending 2024, reflecting a structural shift towards electronic payments.

The economic costs of demonetisation were most visible in employment and informal-sector activity. A 2020 study published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics by economists Gabriel Chodorow-Reich, Gita Gopinath, Prachi Mishra and Abhinav Narayanan estimated the cash shortage caused by demonetisation reduced economic activity and employment by at least 2 percentage points in the October-December 2016 quarter relative to the level that would otherwise have prevailed.

The researchers found the impact was particularly pronounced in districts facing more severe cash shortages, with the effects gradually dissipating over the following months. Separately, official data showed GDP growth slowing from 7.9% in 2015-16 to 7.1% in 2016-17. To be sure, the entire deceleration cannot be attributed to demonetisation. The informal sector, which was heavily dependent on cash, bore a disproportionate share of the disruption.

Ten years on, demonetisation turns out to be a costly economic experiment with its most ambitious promises remaining on paper. Yes, digital payments rose, but one cannot attribute that entirely to demonetisation alone. Data suggests the economic costs of the exercise far outweighed its gains, while several of its stated objectives remain unachieved.