

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) seems to be going all out to defend a falling rupee. It shouldn’t. The Indian central bank’s stated policy has been to intervene in the foreign exchange market only to curb volatility, but its recent actions suggest otherwise.
The RBI started by launching a special FCNR(B) rupee-dollar swap scheme on June 8, 2026, which generated about $133 bn in FCNR(B) deposits by its August 31 closure. Total inflows, including the external commercial borrowing facilities, reached about $143.6 bn by September 18.
Later, the central bank increased the repo rate on October 7, kicking off the rate-hiking cycle against the backdrop of rising US yields and elevated inflation risks, also to support the rupee.
It didn’t stop there. On October 10, the RBI launched a bazooka with a set of measures. First, it prohibited the rebooking of foreign exchange derivative contracts involving the rupee once they had been cancelled with an authorised dealer.
Second, the central bank sharply reduced the threshold for undertaking foreign exchange derivative transactions without establishing the underlying exposure from $100 million to $5 million.
Third, the RBI introduced a Foreign Exchange Risk Reserve (FERR) requirement for rupee-linked foreign exchange derivative contracts with a notional value exceeding $2 mn. Under this, authorised dealers were asked to maintain a cash reserve with the RBI equivalent to 20% of the rupee value of each eligible transaction.
On the same day, the RBI opened a special dollar window for three state-run OMCs to meet their entire daily dollar requirements. All these measures, though aimed at addressing volatility in the currency market, also seem to reflect the central bank’s intent to prevent the rupee from weakening further against the US dollar.
Of course, the Centre wouldn’t want the rupee to cross the psychologically critical 100-mark against the US dollar, considering the political risks and impact on the stock markets. Rupee in free fall can have second-round effects on the economy.
But the key question is did these measures really work to defend the rupee?
The fact, however, is that despite the huge FCNR(B) deposit inflows and an array of measures targeting the rupee, the currency remains in the 94-96 range against the dollar and has not gained much.
This is in sharp contrast to 2013, when the rupee recovered sharply following the FCNR(B) swap scheme. From around ₹67.6 per dollar in early September 2013, it appreciated by about 10 per cent over the following 40 days, while the gains reached 8.8 per cent by March 2014 from late August 2013 levels. Of course, the global economic environment was different then.
The RBI should let the rupee derive its real value from economic fundamentals. The rupee will strengthen only if the economy can attract real, durable foreign capital flows and import-export dynamics improve. Artificially defending the unit can cost the country its reserves and distort price signals. A weak rupee is not necessarily bad for the economy. It can help exporters by making Indian goods and services more competitive in global markets.
The RBI must let the rupee find its level.